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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to analyze the context in which occurred the 
intense urbanization in China over the past 30 years, by comparing the 
different strategies applied by Brazil and China with respect to the urban 
development aimed at improving the Quality of Life, Urban Planning, 
Social Inclusion, Public Participation and Environmental Protection in the 
cities. In this process, we analyzed the legal basis and strategies for 
urban expansion considering their proposals to support the productive 
activity and the structure of economic development.  The selection of the 
two countries was motivated by FIA’s course extension to China, which 
allowed us to observe intense contrasts of the housing policies for the 
inclusion of migrants due to the industrialization process of the two 
developing nations. The comparative analysis was proven to be valid 
because, despite being strikingly different in several aspects, these two 
countries have similar challenges, since both of them deal with the 
enormous challenge of including historically marginalized populations 
within the social context. Thus, this paper proposes to discuss the 
question of why Brazil, with an income per capita many times larger than 
China, has not been able to overtake this country with respect to the 
inclusion of its most poor population within the realm of dignified 
housing, and therefore, include this group within the market practices. 
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RESUMO 
Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o contexto no qual 
ocorreu a intensa urbanização na China nos últimos 30 anos, ao 
estabelecer bases de comparação das estratégias do Brasil e da China no 
que a se refere ao  desenvolvimento urbano visando a melhoria da 
Qualidade de Vida, Planejamento, Inclusão Social, Participação Pública e 
a Proteção do Meio Ambiente nas cidades. Neste processo, foram 
abordadas as bases legais e as estratégias de expansão urbana no 
tocante às suas propostas de suporte à atividade produtiva e à 
estruturação do desenvolvimento econômico.  A seleção dos dois países 
foi motivada pela experiência de  extensão do curso da FIA para a China, 
quando foi possível verificar contrastes intensos em relação à inclusão 
habitacional da massa de migrantes decorrente dos processos 
industrializantes nos dois países em desenvolvimento. Verificou-se válida 
a análise comparativa, pois embora se tratem de realidades com 
inúmeras diferenças, apresentam desafios similares, uma vez que ambas 
as nações lidam com o enorme desafio de incluir socialmente populações 
historicamente marginalizadas. Este trabalho assim propõe abordar um 
debate sobre quais as razões pelas quais o Brasil, mesmo contando com 
uma renda diversas vezes maior, não conseguiu superar a China no que 
tange ao provimento do direito à moradia para sua população mais 
carente, incluindo assim este grupo dentro das práticas de mercado. 
Palavras-Chave: Urbanização, China, Desenvolvimento Urbano, 
Accountability, Cidades, Imigração, Reforma Urbana.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Brazilian cities are required by the City Statute, Law No. 10257, to 
draw up, in a democratic and participatory manner, their Master Plan in order to 
outline the projects that will determine their growth over the next years.  
The preparation of these Master Plans includes the possibility of urban 
planning, leveraging the growth and the utilization of the territory to meet the 
individual and collective needs of its inhabitants, such as housing quality, proper 
public places, efficient mobility and social inclusion. Considering the enormous 
responsibility of the governors in the elaboration of the plan along with the 
concerned population, it is crucial to investigate whether these instruments have 
served their purpose. 
Therefore, the approach to the Brazilian issue begins after an analysis of 
the context involving the urban development strategies applied in China, so that 
it is possible to, based on an external reference, establish new perspectives to 
the housing problems in Brazil. 
2. SUBJECT BACKGROUND 
Brazil has a housing deficit of approximately 5 to 8 million houses 
(Maricato, 2010a). A major unprecedented project in Brazil intends to meet a 
historical demand for housing focused on the low-income population that, due to 
the real estate financing profile in Brazil, has never had access to it (Royer, 
2009). This project will involve companies, will create hundreds of thousands of 
new jobs, will significantly expand the housing territory of thousands of cities and 
will inevitably affect the infrastructure of the Brazilian cities. The Participatory 
Master Plan is a legal instrument for the establishment of the cities, that is, it is 
the instrument that determines the areas of expansion and gives support for a 
proper planning of the infrastructure expansion. Therefore, it is essential that it 
takes into account the several environmental and human factors involved in the 
decision making, and considers what is the involvement of the several 
stakeholders in the elaboration of the document, and also, in the establishment 
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of an urban expansion policy. Often, this policy does not manage to consider all 
market, institutional and population variables during the planning phase. 
A poorly designed Master Plan often characterizes an equally poor 
planning, leading to uncontrollable health, traffic and safety problems. Most 
notably, in major Brazilian cities, there are also illegal occupations and  
3.  THE PERENNIAL CHALLENGE OF PLANNING 
According to Royer (2009), the Brazilian model of urban expansion, in 
general, follows the criteria dictated by the speculative capital, that is, the capital 
that is subject to a particular risk only, very limited or nonexistent, inherent in 
capitalism. The government is assigned the responsibility of generating stable 
conditions for the growth of the cities, relying on an ever-growing demand, 
based on the increased purchasing power of the needy population. The master 
plans are, in the latest definition, a recent tool for the planning of the cities and 
many of them still have their master plans incomplete.  
Still, the federal government managed to start a very aggressive 
program to address the issue, which has lasted for decades, without relevant 
government initiatives. If, according to Campos Filho (lecture at Fecomércio, May 
2010), the Master Plans in Brazil are either superficial or too obvious, then there 
is a lack of real investment in the Planning of the Cities. 
These are currently two countries within the bloc of nations undergoing a 
major development process, with very distinct economic and social profiles, but 
similar in a few aspects, such as the massive migration towards the cities. In this 
regard, despite the massive flow of workers into the major industrial centers, 
China has managed to reasonably control the occupation of these centers without 
indicating problems, such as emergency housing or sub-housing caused by the 
failures of the administration, and the lack of appropriate urban inclusion 
policies. The controversial classification of the Chinese citizens in “peasants” or 
“urban” through the Hukou system contributes to that, that is, it is an identity 
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that provides the citizens rights in the City, or not, in other words, the citizen is 
only allowed to benefit from the State services with a specific identity.  
4. URBANIZING CHINA 
Urbanization in China began almost 4,000 years ago, although Neolithic 
villages had begun sprouting in river valleys as early as 5000 BC (Ebrey, 1996). 
Ho Ping-Ti (Gavinelli and Gibelli, 1976) mentions that large urban centers that 
have arose in Shang times (1700-1100 BC), and the high walls of packed earth 
that surrounded many settlements, including most notably near the cities near 
Cheng-chou and An-yang in Hunan (Gavinelli and Gibelli, 1976). The number of 
cities proliferated during the Zhou dynasty (1122-221 BC). Created primarily to 
fulfill military and administrative roles, these cities also took on other functions 
(Zhao, 1994). 
In the era of the Southern Song Dynasty (12th century), 10-13 percent of 
the Chinese population lived in cities, with Kaifeng, the capital of the Song, 
having a population of almost one million people. At that time, the urban 
population in China was equal to the rest of the world. It is possible to say that 
the urban life in China was perhaps the most developed in the world. Marco Polo, 
during his visit in Hangzhou, was impressed (“the most splendid city in the world 
... with 13,000 bridges mostly of stone”).   The cities were known for their wealth 
and comfort, elegance and cultural life. 
By the late 19th century, however, the urban share of China’s population 
had fallen to 6.0-7.5 percent, although the absolute number of urban dwellers 
had increased considerably. At that time, the industrializing countries of Europe 
had pulled ahead, with urbanization rates of 61 percent in Britain and 29 percent 
in Europe as a whole. This difference had widened further by 1949, when the 
communist regime took hold of the government (Fenby, 2009). Initially, the new 
government allowed cities to grow. Since the 1960’s, however, China has sought 
to tightly manage the course of urbanization (Kwok, 1981; Fang, 1990). The 
intersectoral movement and the fertility rates were restricted with considerable 
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success through the combined efforts of the Communist Party and the 
government bureaucracy (Fenby, 2009). 
The main important instrument of this policy is the hukou system, which 
assigns every person in China a residence in a specific locality. This system 
distinguishes urban from rural residents, with urban households enjoying far 
more benefits and privileges than rural ones (Friedman, 2005). This system was 
enforced in 1958, when the National People’s Congress approved the “Regulation 
of the People's Republic of China on Household Registration.” In these rules, 
every Chinese citizen is registered in a location (hukou suozaidi) and a territorial 
classification (hukou leibie) (Fan apud Yu, 2002, Fei-Ling Wang 2005). Most 
often, this classification is inherited from parents. The agricultural hukou 
provides access to farmland, whereas the non-agricultural hukou provides access 
to jobs, housing, food and state-sponsored benefits. The territorial classification 
of hukou specifies where one is entitled to the above rights. In essence, it 
specifies where one belongs. Until the mid-1980’s, it was extremely difficult for 
rural Chinese people to survive in the cities, because without an urban hukou, 
they did not have access to the necessities of life such as food and housing, 
much of which was centrally allocated. The hukou system, therefore, suppressed 
the migration to a minimum (Cai, 2000; Cao, 2001; Fan, 2008). 
In 1980, there was a wave of local governments charging migrants high 
fees – ranging from several thousands to tens of thousands of yuan - in 
exchange of hukou in small towns and cities. The city governments justified this 
practice by saying that they should be compensated for extending urban benefits 
to migrants. In the early 90’s, large cities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen began 
to offer ”blue stamped hukou” to the migrants who would meet certain 
professional requirements, and were able to make large investments (Fan apud 
Wong and Huen, 1998). Like a US green card. This hukou could be converted 
into a permanent hukou after a certain period. These practices commoditized 
hukou and channeled resources from a very small elite of eligible migrants to the 
coffers of urban governments (Fan apud Cai 2001; Cao 2001). 
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From that time, the cities retained relative autonomy to regulate their 
growth. Thus, most large cities have opted for a gradual easing of the hukou 
restrictions. This change in policy stimulated the multiplication of industries in 
small towns and villages in rural areas, which by 1990 employed 93 million 
workers and accounted for 17 percent of China’s exports of manufactures.   By 
1996, these township and village enterprises (TVEs) employed 135 million people 
and accounted for 46 percent of Chinese exports.  These local productive 
clusters, which often came from communities initially formed in the Great Leap 
Forward of 1959-1962, took great momentum after 1980, with the 
decentralization of the State at that time. The rural industrialization drew on an 
unforeseen reservoir of entrepreneurship and the fiscal decentralization 
encouraged the local authorities to take initiatives in various economic activities. 
The differences between rural and urban areas in China have persistently 
been the main cause of income disparity in China. In part, this huge gap is 
explained by institutional legacies of the Chinese socialism. From the 1950’s, the 
leaders of the Communist Party clearly separated rural and urban residents 
through the hukou system, as previously seen, establishing the industrial and 
urban development as the main objective of the economic planning. On the one 
hand, urban workers, with lifetime employment, as well as free health care, 
housing and various labor benefits. On the other hand, rural residents were 
organized into communes, where the access to basic health and education 
improved considerably. However, in order to accelerate the industrialization of 
the country, the planning system set prices and managed investments in a way 
that caused a discriminatory behavior in relation to agriculture and rural areas, 
leading to huge differences in the living standards between rural and urban 
residents. 
The incredible expansion of the Chinese urban population of 191 million 
in 1980 to 562 million in 2005 and to 622 million in 2010 required a massive 
investment in housing and infrastructure. Unlike what happened in third world 
countries, with much smaller population, China has managed to absorb more 
than 400 million people in its cities without the proliferation of slums, although 
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the urban infrastructure has been compromised in several locations, accounting 
for almost one-third without basic sanitation and waste collection.   Today, out of 
the 20 most polluted cities in the world, 16 are Chinese. 
There are three major factors that ensured and still ensure the relative 
smoothness of the urbanization process in China: the availability of investment 
funds intermediated by the banking system, the strong initiative of the real 
estate industry and the regulatory capacity of the large cities. The role of capital 
generated through domestic savings is crucial in this set. 
According to Beijing University Professor, Fan Gang, China’s government 
encourages rural workers to move to the cities to find better jobs. Therefore, for 
the past 30 years, more than 40 percent of the workforce in China, 
approximately 300 million people, has moved from the agricultural sector to the 
industrial or service sector, now increasingly concentrated in the cities. As a 
result, on average, the migrant workers with rural hukou now outnumber urban 
hukou workers.  Although the hukou system was a major influence in the 
migration control, Professor Gang says that it was not what has prevented the 
growth of slums in China. A thesis is that the most important institution in the 
prevention of extreme urban poverty is a unique system of land in the rural 
areas of China. The whole process of China’s reform began with the adoption of 
the so-called “rural household contract system”, which leases productive lands to 
rural families. This means that the collective production was gradually dissolved 
from the beginning of the reform process, with the private farming prevailing. 
Although the “collective” farms have remained as the owners of the rural land, 
the families can get all the “surplus” of the production, which creates the 
necessary incentive for them to productively use the land. They can even 
transfer the lease to other rural families, if their members find better jobs in the 
cities. 
Families can keep the contract during the lease term (currently 30 
years), but they do not have the right to land ownership. If rural workers face 
financial difficulties, which in other countries often lead to the land sale, they can 
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either make an effort to find another job or seek government assistance. The 
land, however, can never be sold or mortgaged and its use can not be changed 
from agriculture to any other commercial purpose without permission from the 
government.  
This peculiar arrangement has generated an important result: if migrant 
workers lose their urban jobs, they retain some income from their land lease and 
can return to their village and reclaim the back (normally within one year). The 
small portion of land allocated under the rural household contract system may 
not make farmers rich, but it serves as a social safety net of last resort. This 
goes a long way toward explaining why China’s urbanization has lagged: the 
system of land tenure – which seems to be impossible to replicate in other 
developing countries - ensures that the reservoir of labor for industrialization and 
urbanization remains located in the country villages rather than in city slums. 
Although this arrangement provides a smoother path to urbanization, it is 
transitional rather than permanent. Migrant workers still feel unable to truly 
integrate into the cities because their social safety net remains anchored to their 
rural origins.  Indeed, the segregation caused by the land system has expanded, 
rather than narrowed the social disparities. Given these circumstances and the 
high degree of mobility of the Chinese people, the urbanization of the country is 
far from being stable. To achieve a “permanent urbanization,” China must 
develop a new safety net. Announcing the abolition of the hukou system might 
be easy, but it would mean little without institutions that can mitigate the risks 
faced by rural migrant workers in Chinese cities. 
China’s new five-year plan for economic and social development, to be 
introduced in early 2011, may address the issue in a meaningful way, by aiming 
for the establishment of a universal social security system. The plan may also 
require local governments to increase the provision of public goods – including 
education, health care and a minimum level of income protection – to non-hukou 
regular residents.  
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Urban development is a complex and multifaceted process. The key to 
success is a long-term vision and an entrepreneurial management. The incredible 
speed with which Chinese cities expand represents an ongoing challenge to the 
administrative capacity of the local authorities. No other country has faced such 
a challenge so successfully. Large cities, therefore, has been most successful in 
this endeavor than small ones. So far, as we have seen, China has managed to 
avoid slums and crime (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 2009). Chinese cities are cleaner 
than the average, compared to cities of the same income level in other countries 
of similar income per capita, and the combined efforts of the authorities in 
charge for the streets and municipal offices have certified that the policies are 
competently enforced. 
At the same time, the retention policy, or rather the improvement of 
income in rural areas has proved to be efficient. Workers that supply the needs 
of industries in the cities do not get deprived of education or minimum 
allowances for their living, since they have the support of their relatives and 
personal savings. A policy that takes advantage of migration for the cities to 
increase income in the rural area manages to develop, thus improving the 
conditions of the services provided in the rural area, such as infrastructure and 
health, for example. The government recently eliminated the agricultural tax in 
the explicit sense to equally improve the income of rural areas. Some policies to 
improve income in rural areas are emergencies in China, although some of them 
are related to the equation that adds positive effects of migration and 
remittances. These policies include efforts to strengthen the agricultural 
productivity through diversification, technological advances that improve 
productivity and preserve the land, water and other inputs; investment in rural 
infrastructure in areas where the payback period of the investment is higher, the 
provision of contracts for land use that allow more safety and long-term rights to 
farmers; provision of better social services for rural residents; more effective 
rural credit facilities and transfer of resources by pricing mechanisms or 
appropriate tax channels. 
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The size of the cities has also been a determining factor. Economies of 
scale and rapid growth rates in the country follow the frantic growth pace of 
large cities. The urban agglomeration contributes by deepening the labor market, 
introducing economies based on technological advances and encouraging a wide 
range of activities. In a globalized economy, the diversification provided by the 
agglomeration of services and resources, whether human or structural is a safe 
resource that allows the industry to expand in new directions and maintain a 
considerable portfolio of products and a potential to add new activities when the 
existing ones are exhausted. 
As from the Constitutional Amendment of 1988, a reform of major 
significance in the regulatory framework of the land was introduced. Two basic 
principles were established: the first is that the absolute ownership of the land is 
not transferable, but the rights of use are, under certain conditions. The transfer 
of land use can be conducted in accordance with the regulations of the State, and 
subject to the public interest demands.  According to these regulations, two 
types of land transactions are allowed: one is the sale of the rights of use, and 
the other is the transfer of these rights.  In the first type, it was established a 
type of primary market, in which the State or its authorized agencies guaranteed 
the right of use for a specific period of time in exchange for a payment through 
auction, lease or similar negotiation. The periods of time would vary according to 
the purpose of the development proposed. These periods were of approximately 
70 years for residential use, 50 years for industrial, educational, scientific, 
technological, cultural, athletic or multiple use, and 40 years for business, 
tourism and recreational use. The transfer of the land use established a 
secondary market, in which the parties are allowed to transfer, lease or 
mortgage the property rights already guaranteed. The primary market was thus 
monopolized by the State, while the secondary market was intended for 
transactions of private character. The State did not use to take part in the 
secondary market, except in transactions related to land registration, legal 
protection or establishment of various taxes (Qi apud Li, 1999). 
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Still, the process of transferring the rights of land use ended up being a 
potential source of corruption in the lack of an appropriate regulation. The lack of 
transparency to ensure the right of land use led to backdoor deals between local 
authorities and urban speculators with the State bearing the loss of tax 
revenues. The active role of the political influences in the real estate sector 
encouraged real estate developers to establish extensive networks of contacts 
with local administrators to support them in their local negotiations (Qin, 2010). 
This informal institution of guangzi, or personal connection allowed urban 
speculators with political connections to benefit, obtaining illegal benefits from 
the local government leaders. These practices were supported by the particular 
nature of the negotiation process of the land and still continue to play an 
important role in the process of land allocation. 
New laws have further clarified the State role. In July 2002, a regulation 
established that the transfer of land use rights for commercial purposes, such as 
private business, trade, tourism, recreational use or development of housing 
projects would have to go through a process of invitations for bids, auctions or 
announcement for making proposals, and prohibited private agreements. 
Although most of the transfers still occur through private agreements, the legal 
regulation has been increasingly reducing the relevance of transfers by 
instruments that do not belong to the market (Qin, 2010; Zhu, 2002). 
Thus, China seeks to get a balance of power between the different 
players in the real estate market development. The State acts as regulator so 
that the market acts with greater competitiveness and efficiency, while 
preserving the natural mechanisms and enforcing the law when there is no other 
tool for their goals to be achieved. This Law places the State as owner and 
manager of the final land use rights.  Municipal governments have huge 
incentives to foster sales, and require profits more than ever to finance new 
projects. In 70 major Chinese cities, revenues from sales of land use rights have 
increased 140 percent in 2009, reaching 158 billion US dollars. Sales of land use 
rights represent up to 60 percent of the revenues of local governments. 
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In the search for efficiency and redesign of the cities, larger cities in 
China are indeed way better managed than small ones (Yusuf and Nabeshima, 
2008). New alternatives have emerged in its recent urban development scenario. 
An interesting example is the city of Hangzhou, which used its peculiar 
characteristics of topography and spatial distribution to apply the polycentric 
development concept. The polycentric spatial development (which acts as a 
preventive factor against the traffic congestion caused by the excessive focus on 
the city center, with the aid of appropriate calculations of the buildable area by 
the coefficient of utilization), and a well designed transportation system are the 
keys to make cities more livable. 
After all, a serious problem in China is precisely the “spread” along the 
highways. As a consequence of the frequent lack of funding for infrastructure, 
the urban development takes place along the existing highways or secondary 
roads, without much planning.  
The urban spread has its problems and may occur as a result 
of two processes: low urban density resulting from plots with 
large areas; lack of continuity of the urban area, known as 
leapfrogging or urban sprawl. In these cases, while the cost 
of land tends to be low, the economic development pattern 
is insufficient, making it undesirable and the object of 
frequent studies in recent decades. However, the findings of 
the surveys are divided between more compact cities with 
strong centers and good public transportation conditions and 
multinucleated cities often polycentric arrangement, 
theoretically capable of serving both the public and the 
private transportation. (Mascaró, Juan José, 2001) 
The polycentric development of the city of Hangzhou was only possible 
through the participatory design and the efforts of the city government working 
in along with market forces. The city presented the guidelines for a polynuclear 
development through the design and review of the master plans, annexing 
surrounding districts and establishing development zones. Therefore, the active 
participation of various forces played an increasingly important role in the 
development of the real estate market, the absorption of migrant workers and 
the reallocation of industries (Wenz Yue, 2009) 
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4.1 PARTICIPATORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE URBANIZATION 
IN CHINA 
The Public Participation, as a universal value in the efficient planning is 
mentioned in several documents and websites, and we can list some of the key 
values for its practice: 
1 People should have their opinion taken into account in 
decisions about actions that affect their lives and their homes, as well as 
the right to be informed in advance and be proactively involved in a 
significant way; 
2 Participants must have access to all information they need to 
participate in an integrated manner and increase the interest and 
motivation to do so, including the commitment that the opinion of people 
should somehow influence the final decision; 
3 The participation process of the population should respect the 
historical, cultural, environmental, social and political conditions of the 
communities affected by the proposal, including under-represented 
groups, such as indigenous communities, women, children, elderly and 
poor people; 
4 The participation of the population involves participants to 
define how they will participate and promote equality between the current 
and future generations in a sustainable perspective. 
With respect to the governance principles identified previously, the public 
participation should be: started early in the life cycle of the planning of an 
intervention, and sustained in a permanent manner, well planned and structured. 
All players must know the goals, rules, organization, procedures and expected 
outcomes of the participatory process in progress; concise and optimized. Every 
public participation program should take place in the most efficient level of 
decision making, policy, plan, program or project; led by a formally neutral or 
traditional authority and follow the rules known and accepted by all parties. The 
public participation should follow certain ethical rules, professional conduct and 
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moral obligations; focused on negotiable items relevant to the decision process. 
As the consensus is not always possible, the public participation needs to hear 
about the values and interests of the participants and focus on negotiable items. 
The participation of the population in the planning process of the Chinese 
cities is not seen today as a practical tool for solving the problems from the 
perspective of local technocracy. Still, it is possible to see that on specific 
projects, such as the city of Chengdu, the participation of the population in urban 
planning had a strategic character when significant changes in the infrastructure 
of the city required the involvement of all stakeholders in the process. In 1993, 
the city of Chengdu initiated a Comprehensive Plan for the revitalization of the Fu 
and Nan rivers. This plan, which followed the principles of participatory planning 
with collaborative arrangements between public entities and private agents, 
managed to raise awareness in the general public and encouraged a large 
number of investors to invest funds in a more sustainable future for the city and 
its inhabitants. More than 30,000 families, who once lived in the sub-housing 
neighborhoods situated on the banks of both rivers, received appropriate houses 
in an accessible way. Several side projects have addressed the problems of 
sanitation, industrial waste, infrastructure, transportation and communications, 
as well as parks and gardens. Currently, Chengdu is a modern city, clean and 
green, which has not forgotten its cultural or environmental heritage. Large part 
of the original bed of the river was restored and the lessons learned on the 
participatory planning and the arrangements for public-private collaboration are 
applied in various populations and neighboring districts. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1997) 
good governance is the process of decision making and the process by which 
decisions are made. Good governance, therefore, has eight major characteristics: 
it is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, 
effective and efficient, balanced and inclusive, and follows the strictness of the 
Law. This law ensures the reduction of corruption and that the views of the 
minorities are respected in the decision making process. Moreover, it is 
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responsive to the current and future needs of the society (UNESCAP, 2005, 
UNDP, 1997). 
The development strategy through the participation, however, is seen in 
a controlled manner by the authorities, and used for specific purposes. Notably, 
it appears that many large-scale projects with high environmental impact at 
some point include consultative processes to reduce the side effects along with 
the public opinion. However, many of the popular protests that China has seen 
throughout its recent history do not translate into concerns for an increased 
participation in decision-making processes.  
Some drastic side effects have been observed in this process of radical 
changes. The China Daily reported out that in Beijing alone, 4.43 million square 
meters of old courtyards (hutongs) had been demolished since 1990, which 
corresponds to 40 percent of the downtown area. In 2007, the vice-minister of 
construction launched a similar attack on the “senseless actions” of officials who 
knocked down precious sites and cultural relics to produce standardized cities. 
His criticism, however, had no effect to redirect the way China develops its urban 
area. In the absolute transience of the recent urban scenario, according to the 
China Daily, the Chinese building lasts 30 years on average, compared to 74 
years for those in the US and 132 years for British construction. 
A typical case is the redevelopment of Beijing, Andrew Jacobs wrote in 
The New York Times: “The destruction of this 800-year-old city usually proceeds 
as follows: the Chinese character for ‘demolish’ chai (拆) mysteriously appears on 
the front of an old building, the residents wage a fruitless battle to save their 
homes, and quicker than you can say ‘Celebrate the New Beijing’, a wrecking 
crew arrives, often accompanied by the police, to pulverize the brick-and-timber 
structure “(Andrew Jacobs, New York Times, 2009). Historical cities, such as 
Kashgar, have been devastated in the name of a forced redevelopment, and this 
has been an issue ever more present in the Chinese and foreign media. 
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4.2 FUNDING THE GROWTH INFRASTRUCTURE 
The central government introduced a new process of revenues 
decentralization on 1980. For tax purposes, each city is analyzed as a separate 
entity, and that allowed each city to dictate its own policy to collect taxes. After a 
decade of experimentation, in 1994, a broad tax reform was consolidated, 
restructuring the finances of most Chinese cities. For the first time, the cities 
were able to establish local taxes that play an important role in finances and, 
therefore, taxes for land use, construction, real estate development and urban 
maintenance were made possible. The component “land use” is unprecedented in 
developing countries and is an increasingly significant revenue in the global set 
of urban taxes, representing approximately 30 percent of the total revenue. In a 
way, it is possible to verify that the amounts collected float along the market 
variations and, together with other revenues, they make the investments in the 
infrastructure of small and medium-sized cities to be considerably lower, per 
capita, than in the big cities. In some provinces of the central and western 
regions, this process is harmful, which means that decentralization has meant 
that many cities in these regions are steadily losing income (Wu, 2009). 
The effects of the investment in infrastructure on the 
economic performance have several ways to be analyzed. Its contribution is 
proven by the elevated levels of labor and capital productivity, as well as the 
improvement in the quality of life of its inhabitants. Firstly, the investment in 
infrastructure meets the unmet demands and needs, which often represent 
obstacles to the economic performance and future growth. The access to 
infrastructure also contributes for the individuals to connect more easily to the 
economic activities, for example, by providing road works so that the costs 
associated with traffic congestion are significantly reduced. 
The city of Shanghai is a good example of this issue.  With only 10 
percent of the downtown area intended for transportation, it has inherited an 
antiquated network planned in the early 20th century, for pedestrians and 
bicycles. After a major investment in public transportation and transportation 
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infrastructure, with the aid of international agencies, the downtown area of the 
city managed to avoid traffic jams common to other Chinese cities. A report of 
the Academy of Social Sciences Guangxhou (China Academy of Social Sciences, 
quoted in website Want China Times, 2010) points that to quote an example, the 
traffic in Guangxhou represents an expense of 12 billion RMB per year, or 
approximately 7 percent of the local GDP. In addition, investments in 
infrastructure can be used to anticipate future development and encourage 
investments in other economic sectors. When the infrastructure is available, it is 
easier for entrepreneurs to adopt new technologies and, consequently, generate 
technical progress and economic growth.  
4.3 CHALLENGES OF URBAN GROWTH IN BRAZIL 
The intense urbanization process in Brazil had a final landmark as from 
the crisis of 1929 (Fernandes, 2010; Bassul, 2010), with the international crisis 
that shook the Brazilian exports, anchored in coffee production.  This process has 
dramatically accelerated since the industrial leaps experienced by the country in 
the 1950s and 1970s, and the Brazilian population started living massively in 
large cities, which have acquired a metropolitan profile (Fernandes, 2010). 
The cities were forced to deal with the effects of this urbanization, 
without being prepared to do so. The lack of financial resources, arising from the 
lack of a proper tax structure and specific legal instruments (Fernandes, 2010) 
was allied to meet the priority agenda of real estate developers and adopted 
“standards and guidelines framed by the real estate capital movements” (Bassul, 
2010, p. 71). The low wages of most of these immigrants explain the exclusion 
of consumption and essential urban services goods, and a management 
characterized, on the one hand, “by the private appropriation of the public 
investments and, on the other hand, by the segregation of large masses of 
population in slums, tenements and peripheral settlements” (Bassul, 2010, p. 
71). The regulatory planning at the time, instead of reversing the exclusion, 
increased these effects (Fernandes, 2010).  
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In 1963, the first seminar on Housing and Urban Reform held in 
Petrópolis, organized by experts, scholars and politicians, resulted in a document 
marked by an attempt for urban planning and support ideas that decades later 
would be incorporated into the legal order. Several issues included in the agenda 
of this seminar are still very present, but that agenda was practically frozen due 
to the turbulent period of the early years of military dictatorship.  
Still in the military period, an attempt to create a legislation to regulate 
urban growth was drafted as part of CNPU, where, in 1976, a draft law for urban 
development was elaborated, based on the finding that “local governments did 
not have an instrument to cope with real estate speculation and promote the 
distribution of urban public services” (Bassul apud Grazia, 2003, p. 57).  The 
news that such a law was being drafted leaked to the press, which “prompted 
alarmist headlines in some newspapers and magazines of the time, one of which 
alerted readers to the fact that the military government intended to ‘socialize’ 
the urban area” (Bassul apud Ribeiro e Cardoso, 2003, p.12). The government 
drew back (Bassul, 2010). The following year, however, the military government 
presented a new project, motivated by the risk of the cause for urban reform 
serve as a flag from the opposition (Bassul apud Ribeiro and Cardoso, op.cit, p. 
13). The bill, called Urban Development Law, No. 775/83, aimed at “improving 
the quality of life in the cities” (Bassul, 2010). Prepared by CNDU, it contained a 
number of guidelines and relevant instruments, such as: 
1. the recovery of investment by the government resulting in 
real estate valuation; 
2. the possibility for the government to conduct expropriations 
of urban property in order to tackle urban renewal or fight the 
storage of idle land; 
3. the taxation of real estate income resulting from factors 
related to the location of the property; 
4. the conditioning of the right to property (progressive taxation 
and compulsory building); 
5. the regularization of areas occupied by the low-income 
population; 
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6. the legal recognition of the representation exercised by 
residents’ associations; 
7. the incentive to the participation of individuals and 
communities; 
8. the right to community participation in the development of 
plans, programs and projects for urban development; 
9. the legitimacy of the Public Prosecutor Office to propose 
actions in defense of urban planning. 
The project suffered a fierce opposition by conservative entrepreneurs, 
the basis of the government support, which suffered the accusation of wanting to 
end the right of property in Brazil. Thus, the Bill No. 775/83 was never put to a 
vote in the National Congress (Bassul, 2010). 
Growing social demands resulted in the popular organization that, as 
from the 80’s gathered for the National Urban Reform Movement, with the 
massive presence of architects, engineers, geographers and social workers, and 
the strong presence of urban social movements, with the purpose to “fight for 
the democratization of the access to decent conditions of life in the Brazilian 
cities” (Bassul, 2010, p.72). This movement had a decisive influence in the 
incorporation of several “popular amendments” into the Constitution of 1988. 
The City Statute, set of laws that regulate the management of urban 
development in Brazil, is the result of the legal framework made possible by the 
constitution (Fernandes, 2010). 
The City Statute, therefore, is the Brazilian federal law that regulates 
articles 182 and 183 of the Federal Constitution of 1988. Article 182 provides 
that urban policy is the responsibility of the municipality and must ensure the 
social functions of the city and the development of the citizens. It also 
establishes that the Master Plan of the City is the basic instrument for urban land 
use, and should define the use and characteristics of occupation of each portion 
of the municipal territory, so that all properties comply with their social 
function (Barros Carvalho, Montandon, 2010). 
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The author of the bill was Senator Pompeu de Souza, who presented to 
the Senate in June of 1989, obtaining a favorable opinion from the house. A year 
later, he was sent to the House of Representatives, where he remained for 11 
years. After being significantly reformulated, the City Statute was widely 
discussed and approved in 2001, when it was sanctioned by President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. In the justification of his project, Pompeu de Sousa stated 
that he intended to contain the “improper and artificial real estate valuation, 
which hinders the access of the less well-off to lands for housing and burdens the 
government twice, forced to intervene in areas where the valuation comes, most 
of the time, from public investments, financed by all to the benefit of the few” 
(Bassul, 2010). 
The City Statute generates intense debate to date. Even after a great 
international recognition as an advanced legislation, resulting in approximately 
1,500 master plans approved by the municipalities as a result of this legislation, 
the urban realities in Brazil have not significantly changed.  To its supporters, its 
effects may come with the time, since the huge housing deficit and the 
accumulated volume of social and environmental problems in the cities should be 
considered, which is explained by the absence of an urban policy prior to its 
approval (Bassul, 2010). The creation of the Ministry of the Cities in 2003 was 
intended to organize and turn into reality the principles explicit in the City 
Statute, giving conditions to the Union, states and municipalities to materialize 
their projects in line with their goals. 
The approval of the City Statute “consolidated the constitutional order in 
Brazil regarding the control of the urban development processes, aiming to 
redirect the actions of the state, the real estate markets and the society as a 
whole, in accordance with the new economic, social and environmental criteria. 
Its effective materialization into policies and programs will depend on the reform 
of the local legal-urban orders” (Fernandes, 2010, p.68). Thus, the 
municipalities, through the autonomy provided by Law, should determine the 
regulations to control the use and urban development, through appropriate 
master plans and “local urban management processes” (Bassul, 2010). 
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In the current Brazilian scenario of urban development, much is said and 
seen, and, in fact, currently located within a certain comfort mediatic zone in 
relation to the urban social inclusion, since it has been announced that, within 
the comprehensive government project Minha Casa Minha Vida (housing 
program), millions of new homes are under construction and thus most of the 
problems caused by the lack of housing to a huge portion of the Brazilian 
population will be resolved. 
It is worth it to point out that the question of the social function of the 
land is defined by the Constitution in Article 182 as follows: 
“Article 182. The urban development policy, enforced by the 
municipal government, according to the general guidelines established 
by law, intends to organize the full development of the social functions 
of the city and ensure the welfare of its inhabitants. 
Within that same scope of discussion: 
Paragraph 2 – The urban property performs its social function 
when it meets the fundamental requirements for the city’s organization 
set forth in the master plan.”  
Thus, an explicit task of the Master Plans, as management, organization 
and planning mechanisms of the cities, is to clarify that these prerogatives may 
be only enforced when this concept is consolidated by the various agents 
involved in the management of the growth of the city. Thus, the government 
challenge, in general, continues to be huge, given the difficulties of 
implementation and the lack of resources of a public housing policy that would 
serve the population that needs them the most. 
According to Professor Raquel Rolnik, in interview for Globonews channel, 
January 16th, 2011, this space is self-constructed, that is, the public officials are 
not the ones responsible for the planning of cities, but prior to that, this plan 
meets the speculators in order to overcome the shortcomings. Ermínia Maricato, 
in a document that analyzes the City Statute (2010, pg.10), also reminds that 
the lack of an urban law seems to provide a profitable gap for the general 
absence of laws, courts, tribunals and lawyers to resolve the conflicts and to 
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guarantee social, civil and human rights. The lack of public management and the 
lack of any social contract, remit homogeneously poor neighborhoods to the 
situation of “no man’s land” where only “the strongest survives.” It is 
understandable increase in homicides and organized crime in major cities around 
the world not developed in the last 30 years. 
When discussing the financial logic of the real estate production in Brazil, 
it is important to remember that after the military coup of 1964, a financing 
structure to provide better housing conditions was created for the development 
of the real estate market in Brazil. Therefore, according to Luciana Royer (2009), 
“from the institutional standpoint, there is a clear success of the policy 
undertaken based on this initiative.” Regarding the results, the literature shows 
that there was a mismatch between the development of a market of housing 
unit, geared mainly to the middle class, and the guarantee of housing as a 
universal right.  
The Housing Financial System was the first financial mechanism used to 
establish itself as the basis for real estate credit towards the needs of the 
Brazilian market. It was supported by a public funding and the set of actions was 
complemented by the Brazilian System of Savings and Loans (SBPE) and the 
Unemployment Compensation Fund (FGTS), channeling significant part of the 
resources from voluntary and compulsory savings to the development of a 
housing funding (Royer, 2009). This policy, however, was focused on the 
concentration of income, with the allocation of subsidized units to middle and 
upper segments of the population and the appropriation of part of the resources 
by private developers and by the speculative capital (Royer, 2009). 
On the other hand, the SFI sought to use innovative mechanisms such as 
the Certificate of Real Estate Receivables (CRI), the Real Estate Letter of Credit 
(LCI) and the Real Estate Credit Certificate (ICC), seeking to introduce, to a 
lesser extent, a market similar to the North American model (Royer, 2009), 
providing the necessary conditions for the development of a secondary mortgage 
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market, which main function would be to transform these receivables into safe 
currency, provided with liquidity and safety. 
The fragility of the system became evident with the presentation of the 
macroeconomic difficulties of the country, and especially, with the high interest 
rates policy sustained by the Central Bank. The mortgage market competes 
directly with high-yield bonds, such as the national treasury bonds, that is, this 
market has no way to thrive in the face of the monetary policy of the federal 
government. Therefore, it becomes clear the “inefficiency of the SFI as a funding 
model, able to structure universalizing housing policies and its vocation to raise 
housing credit in favor of groups with greater purchasing power” (Royer, 2009). 
On the other hand, the federal housing program Minha Casa Minha Vida 
faces enormous difficulties in serving the families with income of up to three 
minimum wages, a range in which 90 percent of the Brazilian housing deficit is 
concentrated. Data from Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF) indicate that, up to July 
31, 2010, only 3,588 houses were delivered to families with this profile. Out of 
the 604,000 units contracted to date, 275,000 are for the lowest income range. 
As for those families with income between three and ten wages, 149,000 units 
were delivered (Revista Exame, August 2010). 
5. BRAZIL AND CHINA 
With regard to the urban challenge, urbanization can be seen as a means 
to improve the living conditions of the populations. In this context, the 
achievements over the past decades in China have no parallel in the history of 
human civilization. As a result of the radical economic reforms, 400 million 
Chinese people managed to overcome extreme poverty from 1980 to 2001, that 
is, approximately three quarters of the world population. However, although the 
housing conditions have improved considerably on the one hand, on the other 
hand, there is a serious challenge. The current processes of rapid and extensive 
urbanization in China will increase the consumption of natural resources, such as 
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soil, water, forest and minerals, which endanger the environment and the very 
sustainability of this process.  
With respect to the issue of social function, in Brazil, according to the 
National Secretary for Urban Programs of the Ministry of the Cities, Celso 
Carvalho, interview for Agência Brasil, 2010, it should “be defined by a national 
criterion.” Since, however, this assignment was transferred to the municipalities, 
then the state should help the municipalities to implement the concept, so as to 
support the municipalities to properly manage the growth of cities. 
“The City Statute transfers to the municipality the task of making 
the intervention in the private market for lands. Therefore, the federal 
government and the states need to support the municipalities and the 
popular organization so that, in the struggle for the master plan, these 
instruments can be implemented.” 
Thus, it possible to notice a difference with the Chinese model, in which 
the debate on the social function of the urban territory is virtually placed in the 
background, since the State owns not only territory but also manages the 
contradictions of the market, establish aggressive goals and actively 
administrates these goals, getting the real estate players involved for the urban 
development. The contradiction found here is that in none of the two models the 
inclusion of those affected is full, because in China there is neither democracy 
nor the rule of law fully qualified, and in Brazil the legislation is either ignored or 
insufficient to efficiently support the state in the development of an urban policy. 
With regard to the migratory movement issue, as a rule, it occurs 
through a spatial modification in the economic center of the countries, that is, 
countries under increasing industrialization processes have urban concentration 
equally decisive. In particular, migratory movements within China have been 
intense, with entire cities changing their landscape, densifying and even 
emerging. Such migration, however, does not occur in a way that generates the 
accumulation of sub-housing on the outskirts of the cities, as in the case of 
Brazil. 
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The first issues related to the challenges of planning for the twenty-first 
century migration processes are naturally related to infrastructure and pollution, 
both resulting from urbanization. If, in Brazil, the great migratory movement that 
took place in the 1970s largely defined the current infrastructure and the 
“personality” of the cities, in China this movement has occurred in a slight 
continuous manner as from the early 1980’s. In China, it is important to note 
that for Mao Tsé Tung, the cities were nothing more than “industrial centers”, in 
contrast with the “consumer poles,” and that for over 30 years the urban 
population ratio had a very small variation. One theory is that the current ethos 
prevailing in the structure of control and power of the Chinese Communist Party, 
any sign that points to some kind of social instability is widely opposed and, 
therefore, subhousings that represent potential sources of political dissension or, 
as best described, social disharmony, are not accepted, in view of the long 
history of successive social upheavals that brought down several empires over 
thousands of years in the Chinese history..  
Nevertheless, in Brazil, such institutional void spaces are fairly accepted, 
even within the logic of dominance of a political class that does not invest in 
long-term planning. A clear example is the hundreds of deaths in the state of Rio 
de Janeiro, caused by the rainfalls of January 2011, mostly in areas where the 
rules of use are non-existent, and the land management is performed on a 
speculative manner and subject to the fragilities of the rules of occupation on the 
hillsides. Entire neighborhoods built in risky areas, sometimes even approved by 
local governments, are a tragic example of the irregular ruling. 
The massive migration that occurred in China as from the 1980’s is 
unprecedented in the world's history. In 1980, China had an urbanization rate of 
19.6 percent, that is, a rate lower than that of Indonesia (22.1 percent, India 
(23.1 percent) and/or Pakistan (28.1 percent). In 2005, 42.9 percent of China’s 
population was already living in urban areas, a number somewhat lower than the 
world average of 50 percent but very close to the Asian average of 41 percent 
and well above the Indian rate of 28.7 percent. This movement represented a 
flow of 268 million people into the cities, that is, a number that is greater than 
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the increase of the population of the entire Eastern Asia. By 2020, it is expected 
that this number exceeds 60 percent, with over 200 million Chinese people 
joining the existing urban population. The forecast that sustains this growth is 
that the urban economy will generate sufficient jobs to absorb the additions to 
the urban labor force at a constant pace. 
With regard to social organizations, China and Brazil have more 
differences than similarities. The great difference is basically given by the 
considerably more advanced degree of institutional consolidation of Brazil, which 
means that in terms of transparency and accountability, Brazil has evolved 
considerably over the past few years. In parallel with the consolidation of the 
rule of law system, thousands of entities focused on support and social 
development, in addition to those working directly for the preservation of the 
environmental heritage, have both influenced corporate actions and often 
dictated the ethos of these organizations, influencing their practices and the roles 
of the companies in relation to their target audience and the society, in addition 
to monitoring and even coordinating the application of government policies. 
In a comparative perspective with the Chinese experience, it is possible 
to notice that the mechanisms that the Brazilian government has for the 
implementation of this inclusion process are still very poor, since the city 
planning mechanisms are not yet mature enough to promote the permanent 
inclusion of marginalized populations. A clear example is the City Statute, which 
since 2001, despite being internationally recognized as an “advanced” law, still 
has failed to provide real improvements for the Brazilian cities.  
The recent rainfalls of 2009, 2010 and 2011 showed that there are still 
major problems with the land management, which in Brazil is made in a 
speculative and poorly planned manner by the government. The issue of the 
“social function of the urban property,” introduced by the City Statute as a 
priority for the development of a public policy, both for social housing purposes 
and to establish public policies for urban development, has no clear definition in 
the master plans of the cities. 
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At this moment, China has announced that it will invest US$ 200 billion in 
the construction or renewal of 10 million popular houses, in order to offset the 
price increase in the real estate market of the country.  In Beijing, apartments 
can cost US$ 3,000 per square meter. The idea is to stabilize prices, forcing the 
market to work with a considerable supply of properties.  “We want the current 
limited supply of properties to be targeted to those who need housing the most. 
This is the basic reason why we have imposed regulatory measures in the 
market,” says the vice-minister of housing of the Chinese government, Qi Ji. In 
this regard, the Chinese government has responded to this phenomenon with 
measures to contain speculation and discourage the purchase and sale of 
secondary real estate properties. 
Thus, it appears that the Chinese government has the tools to radically 
dictate the supply and prices applied in the market, and uses them to promote 
the full social inclusion in the housing market.  The tools used are often marked 
by arbitrariness and authoritarianism, but the presence of a national project for 
urban development is inevitably visible. 
5. METHODOLOGY  
Based on Malik & Theophilo (2009, p. 37), method "[...] is the path to 
achieve a certain end or purpose. [...] The methodology about how this can be 
achieved ". The methodology has its origin in the theory of knowledge and its 
function is to convey logical and epistemological procedures of knowledge. As 
for the "methodological research is that focused on quest about the paths or 
modes of doing science and discussion on the theoretical and practical 
approaches".    
 The methodological approach, based here based on Chizzotti (2008, p. 
52) involves "the concepts of objectivity, validity and reliability, seeking to 
define the formalization and the rigorous analysis of qualitative studies".  
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 In this research, therefore, the methodological approach used was the 
qualitative methodology, based on literature research and other secondary data. 
We accessed websites and other Chinese universities, as well as the material 
collected from magazines and books on the subject. 
6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The fundamental differences regarding the urbanization of the two 
countries lead to the reflection that the issue of differences finds, in these 
different realities, contradictions that lead to another immediate reflection: how 
did China manage to reasonably include such population in its cities without 
scattering and lack of control, typical of third world countries, even with a per 
capita income five times lower than Brazil’s?  
The answer is divided into a few assumptions, introduced here in order to 
deepen in these reflections: 
1. China, through a comprehensive reform in the property 
system, as many first world countries, ensured access to land through an 
extensive agrarian reform, which works today as a type of social insurance 
for millions of families who can thus support a gradual transition in the 
transfer of their members to the cities. 
2. The Chinese State has mechanisms to manage the urban 
property, which ensure the priority in the land management, but on the 
other hand, it has an authoritarian character and centralizes the decision 
making. 
3. Brazil is still in the beginning of the application of advanced 
laws that have been established but not yet instituted in its essence. Thus, 
the issue of housing inclusion is subject to the rules of a housing market 
that is not focused on addressing the population in need of housing, but on 
those who can fit into it. 
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4. The funding mechanisms in Brazil are still aimed at the middle-
class population, focused on the return of the capital invested and are not 
necessarily intended to the large portion of the population that still lacks 
access to funds or housing credit. 
5. The urban planning in China is conducted in integration with its 
various agents, including real estate developers, public authorities, the 
affected population, and mainly intermediated by a prepared technical 
team.  
6. In Brazil, there is no such integration between the parties.  
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